EUROCONTROL

# EUROPEAN ACTION PLAN FOR MANAGING THE OPERATIONAL SAFETY IMPACT OF UNAUTHORISED DRONE ACTIVITY

Promoting a common approach to prevention, preparedness, response, recovery and continuous improvement.



CONSORTIUM COORDINATOR sesar DEPLOYMENT MANAGER

FOUNDING MEMBER sesar JOINT UNDERTAKING

NETWORK MANAGER



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# ENDORSEMENT

The increasing integration of unmanned aircraft systems into the European aviation ecosystem presents significant opportunities, while also creating new challenges for operational safety, security, airspace management and network resilience. Addressing the consequences of unauthorised or non-compliant drone activity requires a coordinated, multi-stakeholder approach built upon shared understanding, clear responsibilities and effective cooperation.

The EUROCONTROL Drones Impact on Network Operational Safety Working Group (DINOS WG) has brought together experts from across the aviation community, including EASA, air navigation service providers, aerodrome operators, aircraft operators, national authorities, law enforcement and security organisations, to develop practical recommendations aimed at strengthening preparedness, response and recovery capabilities throughout Europe. This collaborative effort demonstrates the value of collective expertise and reflects the shared commitment of EUROCONTROL, EASA and the wider European aviation community to the safe, secure and efficient integration of drones within the aviation system.

This European Action Plan provides a common framework to support operational stakeholders in assessing their current level of preparedness, identifying improvement opportunities, sharing good practices and promoting greater harmonisation across Europe. By encouraging a consistent and coordinated approach, it contributes to the objectives of the EUROCONTROL Network Safety Team (NST) to continuously improve operational safety and strengthen the resilience of the European aviation network, while also supporting EASA's broader aviation safety mission, including the development of common European rules, risk-based oversight and the fostering of a harmonised safety framework for emerging aviation technologies such as drones.

The recommendations contained in this Action Plan are complementary to, and consistent with, existing European guidance, including EASA's Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes (DIMM) manual. Together, these initiatives support a coherent approach to drone incident management by combining practical implementation measures, operational coordination mechanisms and continuous improvement principles across the aviation ecosystem.

EUROCONTROL and EASA commend the work of the DINOS Working Group and encourage all relevant stakeholders to consider the recommendations contained in this Action Plan as part of their efforts to further enhance aviation safety, cooperation and operational resilience across Europe.



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# 1. INTRODUCTION

Unauthorised drone[1] activity in the vicinity of aviation operations is an operational safety hazard, a security concern and a network resilience issue. The risk is not limited to a direct physical collision between a drone and a crewed aircraft. It also includes the operational uncertainty created by sightings, rapidly changing drone positions, limited identification possibilities, unclear intent, increased workload for pilots and controllers, and the potential for local aerodrome and European network disruption.

The EUROCONTROL Drones Impact on Network Operational Safety Working Group (DINOS WG) was established in 2022, within the EUROCONTROL Network Manager cooperative safety arrangements to support the Operational Safety Group (SAFOPS) and the Network Safety Team in improving operational safety related to unauthorised drone operations in European airspace. The DINOS Working Group brings together operational experts from air navigation service providers, aerodrome operators, aircraft operators, regulators, local and regional law enforcement agencies, State security actors and other relevant stakeholders to analyse the operational consequences of unauthorised drone activity and identify practical risk reduction and mitigation measures. Over recent years, the group has collected operational experience, reviewed occurrence data, conducted surveys and workshops, developed guidance material and shared lessons learned from drone-related events across Europe.

The work of the DINOS WG has demonstrated that, while drone-related events occur in many States, the operational response, decision-making criteria, coordination arrangements and technical capabilities often differ significantly between organisations and regions. These differences may lead to inconsistent risk assessments, unequal levels of preparedness and varying disruptive impacts on aviation operations and network performance. At the same time, drone operations, aviation traffic flows and disruption effects increasingly cross national and organisational boundaries, creating a need for greater harmonisation and shared understanding across Europe.

This Action Plan has therefore been developed to promote a common European approach to managing the safety, security and network consequences of unauthorised drone activity. Similar to previous EUROCONTROL action plans addressing other safety priorities, it provides stakeholders with a common framework for assessing capability, implementing practical measures, sharing good practices and monitoring progress over time. The recommendations are intended to support harmonised implementation whilst recognising that local legal frameworks, operational environments and responsibilities differ across States and organisations. By encouraging convergence in procedures, coordination mechanisms and maturity monitoring, the Action Plan aims to strengthen collective resilience and reduce the operational impact of drone-related disruptions across the European aviation network.

# 2. SCOPE

This Action Plan addresses unauthorised, non-cooperative or non-conforming drone activities that may affect aviation safety, (controlled) aerodrome operations, aircraft operations, ATM/ANS service provision, airspace management, or the European Air Traffic network.

The stakeholder groups addressed in this document are ANSPs, aerodrome operators, aircraft operators, national authorities, local and regional law enforcement agencies, State security actors, drone operators and international organisations.

The Plan is intended to be practical. Each organisation should review applicability, consult best practices, conduct local impact and risk assessments, implement locally appropriate actions and share lessons learned with other stakeholders.

The Action Plan is built upon the collective knowledge, best practices and experiences of the DINOS WG while being consistent with, referring to and using the recommendations found in the Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual prepared and published by EASA in 2021, see section 7 References.

[1] *For this action plan the term „drone" will be used as a stand in for „Unmanned Aircraft System" (UAS).*

# 3. FOCUS ON THE CHALLENGE

An unauthorised drone incident usually starts as an information problem. A drone is observed or detected, the credibility and location of the report must be assessed, the possible authorisation status must be considered, and stakeholders must quickly decide whether the activity affects flight safety, security, aerodrome and ATC operations and/or the network.

Human Factors are therefore central to effective drone incident management. Procedures, training and decision-support should account for ambiguous or conflicting reports, uncertainty regarding observations, variable reliability of detection data, time pressure due inherently short reaction windows, workload, confirmation bias and the need to revise decisions as the operational picture develops and changes.

The direct safety risk is a possible collision or hazardous proximity between a drone and a (un)manned aircraft, especially during take-off, approach, landing and low-level helicopter or general aviation operations, specifically over populated areas.

The operational effects include increased ATCO & pilot workload because of traffic information, go-arounds, holding patterns, route changes, diversions, runway suspension, radio telephony (RT) workload, uncertainty around multiple sightings, and difficulty determining when operations can safely resume.

The network effects include ATFM (Air Traffic Flow Management) delays, diversion flows, aircraft and crew displacement, passenger disruption, cancellations and capacity reduction.

The security and law enforcement effects include locating the remote pilot, preserving evidence, determining whether a case affects predominately safety or also aviation security or is criminal in nature, and determining whether active counter-UAS measures are lawful, necessary and proportionate. While the relevant permissions and legal basis for active counter measures must be obtained and established and promulgated before an incident happens.

In 2025, there have been 46 events of sightings of unauthorised UAS near aerodromes in the EUROCONTROL network with reported impact on air traffic operations. These UAS' range from drones and smuggling balloons to unidentified objects in general. At least 34 events lasted longer than 30 minutes and caused ATFM delay. Over the entire year, this resulted in 843 flight cancellations, 423 diversions to other aerodromes and 12.544 minutes of ATFM delay. It should be noted that this only covers events that have been notified to EUROCONTROL NMOC[2].

# 4. HOW TO USE THIS ACTION PLAN

The recommendations in Chapter 6 are organised by stakeholder group. A similar recommendation may appear more than once where implementation responsibility differs between stakeholders.

Each organisation should use the Plan as a practical implementation checklist: review applicable recommendations, map them to local procedures, identify gaps, assign accountable owners, agree timelines, implement measures, exercise/test the process, and share lessons learned after exercises and real incidents.

Because the recommendations are not equally urgent or applicable in every operating environment, each organisation should prioritise them through a local risk- and dependency-based implementation plan. Immediate attention should be given to measures that in order to be established require clear responsibilities, reporting, verification, coordination and operational decision-making. More advanced technical, analytical and optimisation measures should follow where justified by the local threat and risk assessment, operational complexity, legal mandate and available capabilities.

The recommendations are deliberately technology-neutral and focused on roles, functionalities and procedures. Local legal mandates, traffic complexity, airspace design, available detection systems, security arrangements and resources will determine the exact implementation method.

Each recommendation includes evidence or maturity-questions so that the Action Plan can later be converted into an online benchmarking questionnaire and dashboard.

The recommendations in this Action Plan should be considered together with existing European regulatory requirements, national arrangements and relevant guidance material, like the EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual. The Action Plan document does not replace local procedures or legal responsibilities but provides a practical framework to support implementation, benchmarking and continuous improvement across stakeholder groups.

[2] Unauthorised UAV Impact on Air Traffic Management in Europe 2025, EUROCONTROL NMOC/OPA, 2026 (not public, available on request)

# 5. MONITORING OF RECOMMENDATIONS

In addition to the recommendations themselves, each action includes an associated evidence question or maturity assessment question. These questions have been intentionally incorporated into the Action Plan to support a consistent approach to implementation monitoring and continuous improvement across stakeholder groups.

At local level, the questions can be used by organisations as a practical self-assessment and gap-analysis tool. By reviewing the maturity of each recommendation, stakeholders can identify strengths, prioritise improvement actions, allocate resources and monitor progress over time. The objective is not compliance auditing, but to support informed decision-making and continuous enhancement of operational capability.

At European level, the same questions provide the basis for a harmonised benchmarking framework. By using a common set of maturity criteria, implementation progress can be assessed across stakeholder groups, regions and States, enabling the identification of common strengths, recurring challenges and areas requiring additional guidance or support. This allows collective learning and facilitates the exchange of good practices whilst preserving the flexibility needed to accommodate different threat pictures, operational environments and legal frameworks. The resulting maturity information may be used to support future surveys, dashboards and benchmarking activities developed under the DINOS WG framework. The intention is to encourage improvement, promote harmonisation and share lessons learned across Europe, rather than to compare or rank individual organisations.

Monitoring should use a maturity scale, comprising Levels 1 to 5. "N/A" and Level 0 are supporting assessment statuses and are not maturity levels: "N/A" records that a recommendation is not applicable, while Level 0 records that it has not yet been assessed. The model is intended for benchmarking and improvement, not for blame. It can be applied by stakeholder group, recommendation category, region and implementation phase.

Level 1 means initial/ad hoc. Level 2 means developing. Level 3 means implemented. Level 4 means integrated across stakeholders and exercised. Level 5 means optimised, reviewed, benchmarked and improved. "N/A" means not applicable and Level 0 means not assessed.

| Level | Maturity label | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| N/A | Not applicable | The recommendation is not applicable. |
| 0 | Not assessed | The recommendation has not been assessed. |
| 1 | Initial | Activities are ad hoc, informal or dependent on individuals. |
| 2 | Developing | A draft approach exists with partial implementation or limited stakeholder alignment. |
| 3 | Implemented | The recommendation is documented, assigned and used in routine operations. |
| 4 | Integrated | The measure is coordinated across stakeholders, exercised and connected to data, reporting and lessons learned. |
| 5 | Optimised | The measure is reviewed, benchmarked, improved and used to support wider learning. |

# 6. RECOMMENDATIONS

## 6.1. AERODROME OPERATORS

| Ref | Recommendation | What and how it should be done | Evidence / maturity question |
|---|---|---|---|
| ADR1 | Establish a local Drone Incident Management Cell (DIMC) or equivalent coordination structure. | Coordinate with the ANSP, local or regional law enforcement agencies, State security actors, aircraft operators, national authorities and other relevant actors before, during and after incidents. Maintain contact lists, decision roles and escalation routes.<br><br>Ref. EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual, Part 2.2.2. | Is a local coordination body or equivalent mechanism established and exercised? |
| ADR2 | Conduct local drone risk assessments with ANSP and representatives of LEAs. | Identify the hazards, plausible threat scenarios and an assessment of the level of risk by analysing their likelihood and severity of impact together with relevant local stakeholders.<br><br>Ref. EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual, part 2.2.3 | Is drone threat assessment embedded in aerodrome safety/ security risk management with ANSP and police/security participation? |
| ADR3 | Agree stakeholder ownership and decision rights for detection, identification and mitigation activities. | The aerodrome operator should agree with the ANSP, local or regional law enforcement agencies, State security actors and relevant national authorities who detects, who verifies and identifies, who assesses whether activity threatens aircraft or people, who may authorise and perform mitigation, who funds capability and who communicates across overlapping areas. Ownership may differ between detection, identification and mitigation functions.<br><br>Ref. EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual, Part 2.2.5, 2.2.6 and 2.2.7. Also part 3 annex 3.6 Threat Zones and Air Traffic Control response and annex 3.2 Drone incident management flow chart. | Are stakeholder ownership and decision rights separately defined and agreed for detection, verification, identification, threat assessment and mitigation? |
| ADR4 | Develop and maintain threat-zone maps and operational response criteria to different threat/ risk levels. | Use local features, runway configuration, approach/departure paths, helicopter routes, public areas, protected sites and detection/response capability to define threat zone maps, threat levels and response criteria.<br><br>Ref. EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual, Part 2.2.5 and 2.2.6.and part 3 annex 3.6 Threat Zones and Air Traffic Control response | Are threat zones and response criteria documented and reviewed? |
| ADR5 | Maintain a common local drone incident response workflow with all relevant stakeholders. | Aerodrome operators should agree with the ANSP, aircraft operators, local or regional law enforcement agencies, State security actors and network operations, as applicable, on a common local drone incidence response workflow. The workflow should connect detection/reporting, verification, threat assessment, operational decision, security/enforcement action, communication and recovery.<br><br>Ref. EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual, part 2.2.6 and part 3, annex 3.2 Drone incident management flow chart. | Is there one agreed local drone incident workflow across stakeholders?<br><br>Does the workflow include all the recommended elements? |

| Ref | Recommendation | What and how it should be done | Evidence / maturity question |
|---|---|---|---|
| ADR6 | Where necessitated by local risk profiles, integrate real-time multilayer drone detection system in support of operational decision-making support. | Where justified by the local threat and risk assessment, operational complexity and available capability, real-time multilayer drone detection should be connected to roles, responsibilities and procedures. Detection should distinguish authorised from unauthorised drone flights and support conformance monitoring against submitted flight plans, while recognising uncertainty and the possibility of false or ambiguous indications.<br><br>Ref. EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual, Annex 3.7a. Considerations for Procurement and Testing of technological C-UAS Solutions and Annex 3.7b. Overview of technological C-UAS solutions | Where justified by local risk, is real-time multilayer drone detection available, and are its outputs, limitations and reliability linked to defined responsibilities, actions and authorisation/ conformance information? |
| ADR7 | Promote recurrent tabletop exercises using the DINOS template. | Exercises should include ANSP, aerodrome operations, police/ security, aircraft operators and observers. Scenarios should test communication, uncertainty, escalation and recovery.<br><br>Ref. DINOS WG Tabletop Exercise template V2. | Is an exercise programme in place and are lessons tracked to closure? |
| ADR8 | Define and jointly agree recovery and return-to-normal criteria. | The aerodrome operator should define and agree with the ANSP and relevant law enforcement agencies and State security actors the criteria for runway reopening, incident termination, last-sighting rules, traffic recovery, public communications and network coordination. Decision ownership should be explicit for each criterion.<br><br>Ref. EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual, part 2.2.6 and part 3 annex 3.2. Drone incident management flow chart. | Are aerodrome recovery actions, stakeholder inputs and return-to-normal criteria jointly defined and exercised? |
| ADR9 | Implement safety promotion and public awareness activities for local drone users. | Use local campaigns, signage, industry engagement and digital channels to reduce inadvertent unauthorised operations.<br><br>Ref. EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual, part 2.2.9 and 2.10.6.4 | Are awareness activities targeted at local drone users and reviewed for effectiveness? |
| ADR10 | Establish and maintain a local drone coordination and partnership forum. | Establish, convene or support a recurring local drone coordination and partnership forum, where justified by the local operating environment, and drone-related risk.<br><br>The forum should promote cooperation, information sharing and mutual understanding between stakeholders with an interest in drone operations and their impact on aviation. Participants may include ANSPs, aircraft operators, local and regional law enforcement agencies, national authorities, municipalities and city governments, State Security Actors, military representatives where relevant, drone operators, drone associations, infrastructure providers and other local stakeholders.<br><br>The forum should address topics such as local drone trends, recurring hotspots, planned drone activities, awareness campaigns, reporting and lessons learned, community engagement, infrastructure developments, emerging technologies and opportunities to reduce the safety, security and operational impact of unauthorised drone activity.<br><br>The forum is distinct from a Drone Incident Management Cell (DIMC). Its purpose is to foster long-term collaboration, prevention, preparedness and continuous improvement rather than operational incident response. | Does the aerodrome participate in or facilitate a recurring local drone coordination and partnership forum involving relevant public authorities, aviation stakeholders and representatives of the drone community to improve cooperation, awarenes and the safe integration of drone operations? |

| Ref | Recommendation | What and how it should be done | Evidence / maturity question |
|---|---|---|---|
| ADR11 | Maintain a joint lessons-learned , post-incident analysis and review process of the effectiveness of established counter drone procedures and mitigation measures | Aerodrome operators should coordinate debriefs, action tracking, owner assignment and updates to local procedures with ANSPs, operators and security actors.<br><br>The objective of this process by the actors of the Drone incident management cell is to ensure the continued improvement of safety and security procedures so that potential operational disruptions caused by any future unauthorized drone incidents can be avoided or minimized.<br><br>Ref. EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual, part 2.9 and 2.10. also part 3, Annex 3.9. | Are lessons captured, assigned and used to update local aerodrome operator's procedures? |
| ADR12 | Report occurrence in accordance with relevant national or European reporting requirements for Aerodrome Safety Managers (via the organization or as an individual) | Reports should capture operational impact and post-event actions.<br>The information should support encounter classification by providing relevant operational information. | Does company reporting collect the information needed for risk classification? |
| ADR13 | Assess side effects of detection and counter-UAS measures before operational deployment. | Aerodrome operators should assess operational, legal, spectrum, aviation-safety, privacy and security effects before deploying technical measures. | Is a safety/security/legal impact assessment completed before deployment? |
| ADR14 | Use local signage to deter unauthorised drone use around the aerodrome perimeter and identified hotspots. | Where supported by the local risk assessment, place clear and visible signage at perimeter access points, public viewing areas and other recurring drone hotspots. Align messages with national geographical-zone information and local awareness campaigns, and coordinate with local authorities and the drone community where appropriate.<br><br>Ref. EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual part 2.10.6.4 and part 3, Annex 3.1 on public awareness campaigns | Is targeted signage used at relevant perimeter locations and drone hotspots, and is its effectiveness periodically reviewed? |
| ADR15 | Implement proportionate drone deterrence measures around the aerodrome. | Assess the need for and implement appropriate deterrence measures to reduce the likelihood of unauthorised drone activity affecting aerodrome operations. Measures may include security patrols, targeted monitoring of known hotspots, perimeter inspections, signage, public awareness initiatives, stakeholder engagement, reporting mechanisms, and visible security presence in locations where recurring drone activity has been observed.<br><br>Ref. EASA EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual, Part 3, Annex 3.4 Suggested Methodology for local risk Assessment and conclusions drawn from it. | Has the Aerodrome Operator established and periodically reviewed a risk-based drone deterrence strategy, including preventive measures, stakeholder cooperation arrangements, and targeted actions for known or emerging drone hotspots? |
| ADR16 | Participate in the development and operation of a common real-time situational awareness and information-sharing mechanism. | In cooperation with the ANSP, local or regional law enforcement agencies and State security actors, develop and operate a mechanism that supports timely exchange of available information on UAS-related threats, including location, trajectory, behaviour, source reliability, uncertainty and assessed risk, thereby supporting safe and efficient aerodrome operations. | Is the aerodrome equipped with capabilities, resources, procedures and, where justified, technology to support situational awareness and information-sharing mechanism? |

## 6.2. AIR NAVIGATION SERVICE PROVIDERS

| Ref | Recommendation | What and how it should be done | Evidence / maturity question |
|---|---|---|---|
| ANSP1 | Conduct local drone risk assessments jointly with aerodrome operators and state security actors. | ANSPs should contribute the airspace, runway configuration, traffic complexity, approach/departure path, ATC workload and network-impact information to the local drone threat and risk assessments. | Is ATC/ATM input included in local drone threat and risk assessment? |
| ANSP2 | Support threat-zone maps and operational risk criteria for local drone response. | ANSPs should provide operational input regarding airspace, runway-use, approach/departure, helicopter-route and traffic-management so that threat zones and response criteria are usable for ATC decision-making.<br><br>Ref. threat zones and response in EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual, part 3 annex 3.6 | Are local threat zones and response criteria aligned with ATC operational needs? |
| ANSP3 | Participate in, and support, the local Drone Incident Management Cell (DIMC) or equivalent coordination structure. | ANSPs should provide ATC/ATM expertise, operational impact assessment, traffic-management implications, reporting links and recovery inputs to the local coordination structure with the aerodrome operator, local or regional law enforcement agencies, State security actors and other relevant stakeholders before, during and after drone incidents.<br><br>Ref. EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual, Part 2.2.2. | Is the ANSP represented in the local coordination body and are ATC/ATM roles exercised? |
| ANSP4 | Establish and maintain local ATC procedures for unauthorised drone reports and detections. | Procedures should cover report receipt, clear verification of the report or detection to the extent operationally practicable, supervisor notification, pilot information, TWR/APP/ACC coordination, aerodrome operator/security coordination, reporting, recovery and post-event review. Verification should reduce avoidable escalation caused by misidentification while not delaying proportionate precautionary action where safety may be affected.<br><br>Ref. DINOS Good Practice Guide as a practical reference. | Are unauthorised drone procedures documented, and do they include proportionate verification, training, exercising and review after events? |
| ANSP5 | Where justified by local risk, integrate real-time multilayer drone detection as operational decision-support. | Where justified by the local threat and risk assessment, operational complexity and available capability, real-time multilayer drone detection should be connected to roles, responsibilities and procedures. Detection should distinguish authorised from unauthorised drone flights and support conformance monitoring against submitted flight plans, while recognising uncertainty and the possibility of false or ambiguous indications. | Where justified by local risk, is real-time multilayer drone detection available, and are its outputs, limitations and reliability linked to defined ATC positions, responsibilities, actions and authorisation/conformance information? |
| ANSP6 | Use objective threat-based response levels. | Define response levels using drone location, altitude, runway configuration, critical zones, authorisation/conformance status, credibility, number of objects and uncertainty. Response levels should link to predefined ATC actions and support decision-making under pressure, workload and incomplete or conflicting information.<br><br>Ref. DINOS Good Practice Guide as a practical reference, which is based on Ref. EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual, Part 2.2.5 and 2.2.6.and part 3 annex 3.6 Threat Zones and Air Traffic Control response. | Would different supervisors normally reach the same response decision using the procedure? |

| Ref | Recommendation | What and how it should be done | Evidence / maturity question |
|---|---|---|---|
| ANSP7 | Participate in recurrent multi-stakeholder tabletop exercises using the DINOS template and relevant EASA guidance. | Use the DINOS tabletop template and the EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes material, as applicable, to validate communications, stakeholder roles, decision-making, detection-data use, escalation and recovery. Include observers, debrief reports and action tracking.<br><br>Ref. DINOS WG Tabletop Exercise template V2. | Are recurrent multi-stakeholder exercises conducted using relevant DINOS and EASA material, and are resulting actions tracked to closure? |
| ANSP8 | Use evidence-based encounter likelihood and severity assessment where data is available. | Use detection data, machine learning, ADS-B/manned aircraft data, proximity classification, relative trajectory, flight phase, drone mass, collision speed and encounter context to improve risk understanding. | Can the organisation quantify encounter likelihood and severity using comparable data? |
| ANSP9 | Strengthen incident reporting and lessons learned feedback. | Map local reporting to occurrence reporting and drone taxonomy work. Ensure serious or repeated events are reviewed and lessons are fed back into procedures, training and stakeholder coordination. | Is there a feedback loop from occurrences and exercises into procedures and training between stakeholders? |
| ANSP10 | Connect drone incidents to network escalation when disruption potential exists. | Where operations may be constrained, coordinate with aerodrome operators, aircraft operators and network operations to manage capacity, diversions, ATFM impact and recovery. | Can the stakeholder show how local drone disruption is escalated when network effects are possible? |
| ANSP11 | Clarify ANSP decision rights for detecting, verifying and responding to drone activity. | ANSP procedures should define what ATC can decide, what must be escalated, who verifies information, how decisions are coordinated with aerodrome/security actors and how uncertainty is managed. | Are ANSP decision rights and escalation criteria defined for drone activity? |
| ANSP12 | Contribute to local recovery and return-to-normal criteria through the incident management cell. | ANSPs should agree criteria for traffic resumption, runway reopening support, capacity recovery, holding/diversion management, network coordination and post-event review. | Are ATC recovery actions and return-to-normal criteria defined and exercised with stakeholders? |
| ANSP13 | Establish and maintain a local drone coordination and partnership forum. | Establish, convene or support a recurring local drone coordination and partnership forum, where justified by the local operating environment, and drone-related risk.<br><br>The forum should promote cooperation, information sharing and mutual understanding between stakeholders with an interest in drone operations and their impact on aviation. Participants may include Aerodromes, aircraft operators, local and regional law enforcement agencies, national authorities, municipalities and city governments, State Security Actors, military representatives where relevant, drone operators, drone associations, infrastructure providers and other local stakeholders.<br><br>The forum should address topics such as local drone trends, recurring hotspots, planned drone activities, awareness campaigns, reporting and lessons learned, community engagement, infrastructure developments, emerging technologies and opportunities to reduce the safety, security and operational impact of unauthorised drone activity.<br><br>The forum is distinct from a Drone Incident Management Cell (DIMC). Its purpose is to foster long-term collaboration, prevention, preparedness and continuous improvement rather than operational incident response. | Does the ANSP participate in or facilitate a recurring local drone coordination and partnership forum involving relevant public authorities, aviation stakeholders and representatives of the drone community to improve cooperation, awareness and the safe integration of drone operations? |

| Ref | Recommendation | What and how it should be done | Evidence / maturity question |
|---|---|---|---|
| ANSP14 | Use a common local drone incident response workflow with aviation and security stakeholders. | The workflow should connect reporting/detection, verification, threat assessment, ATC decisions, security/enforcement action, communication, recovery and learning.<br><br>Ref. EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual, part 3, annex 3.2 Drone incident management flow chart. | Is the ANSP procedure aligned with one agreed local drone incident workflow? |
| ANSP15 | Assess operational side effects of detection and counter-UAS measures before deployment. | ANSPs should assess possible effects on CNS, ATC operations, aircraft safety, spectrum, data protection and operational procedures before detection or mitigation measures are connected to operations. | Are operational side effects assessed before detection or counter-UAS capability is deployed? |
| ANSP16 | Report occurrences in accordance with relevant national or European reporting requirements for ATC and AFIS staff (via the organization or as an individual) | Reports should capture flight phase, pilot perception, ATC instructions, operational impact and post-event actions. The information should support encounter classification by providing relevant operational information. | Does company reporting collect the information needed for risk classification? |
| ANSP17 | Participate in the development and operation of a common real-time situational awareness and information-sharing mechanism. | In cooperation with the aerodrome operator, local or regional law enforcement agencies and State security actors, develop and operate a mechanism that supports timely exchange of available information on UAS-related threats, including location, trajectory, behaviour, source reliability, uncertainty and assessed risk. Define ATC roles, responsibilities, authorities and operational use of the information. | Are ATCOs provided with the tools, procedures and operational support needed to contribute effectively, and are their roles, responsibilities and authorities clearly defined and formally assigned? |
| ANSP18 | Integrate Human Factors considerations into drone incident management, training and operational decision-making. | ANSPs should ensure that drone incident management procedures, training programmes and operational support arrangements explicitly address Human Factors considerations associated with unauthorised drone activity. This should include decision-making under uncertainty, repeated or conflicting drone sightings, the reliability and limitations of detection information, alarm fatigue, controller workload, confirmation bias, communication challenges, and the handover of situational awareness between operational teams. | Has the organisation assessed and integrated Human Factors considerations related to drone incidents into procedures, training, exercises and operational support arrangements? |

## 6.3. AIRCRAFT OPERATORS

| Ref | Recommendation | What and how it should be done | Evidence / maturity question |
|---|---|---|---|
| AO1 | Ensure flight crew procedures cover drone sightings, ATC communication and post-flight reporting. | Procedures should support concise reporting of location, altitude/relative position, direction, phase of flight, manoeuvre and operational consequence. | Are crews trained to report drone sightings in a consistent and operationally useful way? |
| AO2 | Train crews on the operational risk of drones beyond the structural damage of collision impact. | Training should cover workload, startle effect, uncertainty, visibility limitations, go-around/diversion considerations and limitations of visual detection. | Does recurrent training include drone events and operational decision-making examples? |
| AO3 | Support recovery and return-to-normal planning after drone incident. | Aircraft operators should provide operational-control, crew, passenger, diversion and schedule-recovery inputs to local recovery planning and post-event review. | Are aircraft operator recovery needs considered in local drone incident procedures? |
| AO4 | Report occurrence in accordance with relevant national or European reporting requirements for pilots and flight crew (via the organization or as an individual) | Reports should capture flight phase, pilot perception, ATC instructions, operational impact and post-event actions. The information should support encounter classification by providing relevant operational information. | Does company reporting collect the information needed for risk classification? |
| AO5 | Include drone disruption in operational-control and network-resilience planning. | Plan for drone strike risk, delays, diversions, passenger disruption, crew schedule disruption, aircraft schedule disruption, fuel requirements and alternate-aerodrome capacity. | Does the OCC process include drone disruption and simultaneous diversion scenarios? |
| AO6 | Participate in local Drone Incident Management Cell (DIMC) where operator input is needed. | Aircraft operators should support local coordination by sharing operational impact information, diversion and recovery constraints, crew reporting needs and lessons learned from drone events. Operator feedback can improve procedures, ATC information needs, disruption management and recovery planning. | Is there a route for aircraft operator' input into local drone incident coordination and post-event learning? |
| AO7 | Share operational lessons from drone events with local stakeholders. | Operator feedback can improve procedures, ATC information needs, disruption management and recovery planning. | Is there a route to share lessons under appropriate safety-culture arrangements? |
| AO8 | Participate in recurrent drone disruption exercises where operational input is relevant. | Aircraft operators should support scenarios involving go-arounds, diversions, crew reporting, passenger disruption, operational control and recovery planning. | Do aircraft operators participate in relevant local and hub aerodrome drone exercises and post-exercise learning? |

## 6.4. STATES & REGULATORS

| Ref | Recommendation | What and how it should be done | Evidence / maturity question |
|---|---|---|---|
| REG1 | Establish a national drone safety and security coordination mechanism. | Coordinate transport/infrastructure, interior, defence, CAA, ANSP, aerodrome operators, local and regional law enforcement agencies, State security actors and military stakeholders. Define mandates, information sharing and escalation. | Are relevant ministries, aerodrome operators and operational actors jointly represented in national drone threat governance? |
| REG2 | Support local rapid situational awareness and information-sharing mechanisms. | Establish and maintain an appropriate legal, regulatory and governance framework that enables cooperation between ANSPs, aerodrome operators, local or regional law enforcement agencies and State security actors. The framework should define roles, responsibilities, authorities and coordination mechanisms, and provide a legal basis for timely information exchange and proportionate counter-UAS measures. | Does the national framework clearly define stakeholder roles, responsibilities and authorities in local situational awareness and information-sharing mechanisms, and provide a sufficient legal basis for coordinated responses to UAS-related threats? |
| REG3 | Clarify legal authorities and operational mandates for drone mitigation. | Define who may authorise and perform mitigation, including active counter-UAS measures, and under which legal, safety, spectrum, privacy and proportionality conditions. | Is there a documented mandate for drone mitigation and counter-UAS intervention? |
| REG4 | Develop a national drone threat situation picture. | Integrate cooperative and non-cooperative drone traffic information, detection, incident reports, intelligence and cross-border exchange where lawful and feasible. | Is there a national mechanism to integrate cooperative and non-cooperative drone information? |
| REG5 | Promote implementation of joint local drone incident procedures at aerodromes and ATC units. | Provide guidance, oversight support, implementation surveys or gap-analysis tools aligned with this Action Plan. | Is local implementation monitored through a survey, audit, LSSIP/RASP-style mechanism or equivalent? |
| REG6 | Create and promulgate reliable UAS geographical-zone (UGZ) information and operator awareness. | Define zones, restrictions, authorisation requirements and safety information accessible and understandable to drone users. | Are geographical zones and authorisation requirements accessible to users? |
| REG7 | Coordinate national and cross-border information sharing on incidents and lessons learned. | Serious events, detection patterns and enforcement lessons should be shared nationally and internationally where lawful and appropriate. | Is there an agreed mechanism for sharing drone incident lessons with stakeholders? |
| REG8 | Ensure local drone incident management cells or equivalent coordination structures are established where assessed risk necessitates them. | National authorities should enable and, where appropriate, oversee local coordination between ANSPs, aerodrome operators, aircraft operators, local or regional law enforcement agencies, State security actors and regulators, including mandates, escalation routes and information-sharing arrangements. | Are local coordination structures established and supported by national guidance or oversight? |
| REG9 | Promote consistent threat-zone mapping and operational risk criteria for aerodromes. | National authorities should support or oversee the development of local drone threat-zone maps and response criteria, ensuring consistency with airspace, aerodrome and security requirements. | Are threat-zone mapping and response criteria supported by national guidance or oversight? |
| REG10 | Clarify national ownership and mandates for detect, identify, mitigate and enforce activities. | National authorities should maintain a mandate map showing which stakeholder detects, identifies, mitigates, authorises intervention, funds capability and enforces or prosecutes drone offences. | Is there a national mandate map for detection, identification, mitigation and enforcement? |

| Ref | Recommendation | What and how it should be done | Evidence / maturity question |
|---|---|---|---|
| REG11 | Encourage recurrent multi-stakeholder drone exercises at locations where assessed risk necessitates them. | National authorities should promote exercise programmes, support common scenarios and encourage action tracking across aerodromes, ANSPs, aircraft operators and security actors. | Are local drone exercises encouraged or monitored through national mechanisms? |
| REG12 | Promote recovery and return-to-normal criteria as part of local drone incident management arrangements. | National authorities should encourage local coordination bodies to define recovery criteria, closure rules, network communication and post-event review expectations. | Are recovery criteria included in local drone incident management arrangements? |
| REG13 | Clarify legal authorities and operational mandates for drone detection. | Define who may deploy, operate, fund and receive outputs from drone detection capabilities, including information-sharing conditions and oversight responsibilities. | Is there a documented mandate for drone detection and use of detection outputs? |
| REG14 | Clarify legal authorities and operational mandates for drone identification. | Define who may identify a drone, remote pilot or operator, who may access registration or authorisation information and how identity information may be shared between aviation and security actors. | Is there a documented mandate for identifying drones, remote pilots and operators? |
| REG15 | Clarify legal authorities and operational mandates for enforcement and prosecution. | Define who investigates, seizes evidence, initiates administrative or criminal enforcement, prosecutes offences and shares enforcement outcomes for lessons learned. | Is there a documented mandate for enforcement, prosecution and feedback of outcomes? |
| REG16 | Support national and local lessons-learned processes for drone incidents and exercises. | National authorities should encourage structured learning, action tracking and sharing of relevant lessons nationally and internationally where lawful and appropriate. | Are lessons from drone incidents and exercises shared through agreed mechanisms? |
| REG17 | Set expectations for assessing side effects of detection and counter-UAS measures. | National authorities should require or promote assessment of operational, legal, spectrum, aviation-safety, privacy and security effects before deployment. | Are impact-assessment expectations defined for detection and counter-UAS deployment? |
| REG18 | Use maturity assessment to support improvement. | National authorities should use survey or dashboard outputs for gap analysis, improvement planning and knowledge sharing, with appropriate anonymisation or aggregation where needed. | Are assessment results used for improvement planning and knowledge sharing? |
| REG19 | External communication | Appoint one of the National Competent Authorities as responsible to coordinate the external communication about incidents and provide models for communication level of depth to not jeopardize future drone incident response effectiveness. | Is the communication response coordinates with the other stakeholders, such as aerodrome operators, the ANSPs, and LEA. |

## 6.5. STATE SECURITY ACTORS

| Ref | Recommendation | What and how it should be done | Evidence / maturity question |
|---|---|---|---|
| SSA1 | Participate in the local Drone Incident Management Cell (DIMC) or equivalent coordination structure. | State security actors should provide enforcement, evidence, intervention and security-threat input to the local coordination structure and align operational expectations, contact points, escalation routes, evidence needs and intervention constraints with aviation stakeholders.<br><br>Ref. EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual, Part 2.2.2. | Are state security actors represented in the local coordination body and are their roles exercised? |
| SSA2 | Establish coordination procedures with aerodrome operators, ANSPs and local or regional law enforcement agencies for drone incidents. | State security services and other specialised national security actors should define contact points, priority communication, tasking, information exchange, escalation and, where appropriate, handover back to the responsible local or regional law enforcement agency after the immediate high-severity phase. | Are contact points, communications, escalation, tasking and handover procedures agreed and tested with aerodrome operators, ANSPs and local or regional law enforcement agencies? |
| SSA3 | Contribute to local drone risk assessments with aerodrome operators and ANSPs. | State security actors should contribute threat, enforcement, intervention, evidence and legal feasibility input to local drone risk assessments and mitigation planning. | Are security and enforcement inputs included in local drone threat and risk assessment? |
| SSA4 | Clarify security-actor decision rights for identification, intervention and enforcement. | State security actors should define who may identify the remote pilot, preserve evidence, authorise intervention, stop the flight, seize equipment and initiate enforcement or prosecution. | Are security decision rights for drone identification, intervention and enforcement defined? |
| SSA5 | Build specialist aviation enforcement/prosecution expertise. | Specialist expertise can support drone cases, legal consistency, policy development and publication of decisions where lawful and appropriate. | Does the State have access to specialist aviation enforcement or prosecution support for drone cases? |
| SSA6 | Participate in recurrent tabletop exercises using the DINOS template. | Exercises should address security response, evidence handling, remote-pilot location, intervention decisions, communication with aviation stakeholders and legal escalation. | Do state security actors participate in periodic joint drone tabletop exercises and track actions to closure? |
| SSA7 | Assess side effects and proportionality of counter-UAS measures before use. | State security actors should assess legal basis, proportionality, spectrum effects, aviation safety, privacy, evidence implications and operational consequences before active measures are used. | Are counter-UAS side effects and proportionality assessed and recorded? |
| SSA8 | Participate in the development and operation of a common real-time situational awareness and information-sharing mechanism. | In cooperation with the ANSP, aerodrome operator and local or regional law enforcement agencies, develop and operate a mechanism that supports timely exchange of available information on UAS-related threats, including location, trajectory, behaviour, source reliability, uncertainty and assessed risk, thereby enabling coordinated and effective security responses. | Are State security roles, responsibilities and authorities in the mechanism clearly designated, and does the framework support timely operational and enforcement action when escalation to State security is required? |
| SSA9 | Adopt a phased law-enforcement response model. | Use phases such as low threat, potential threat and confirmed threat. Align each phase to frontline enforcement, remote-pilot location, stopping the flight, examination of the UAS, intervention or full investigation. | Does law enforcement use a documented phase model for drone incidents? |

| Ref | Recommendation | What and how it should be done | Evidence / maturity question |
|---|---|---|---|
| SSA10 | Equip frontline responders with simple drone incident tools. | Support frontline officers with apps, pre-filled reports, offence categories, evidence guidance and escalation criteria. | Do frontline responders have practical tools for identifying drone offences and follow-up actions? |
| SSA11 | Set formal reporting and investigation thresholds. | Define when events should be escalated to police, prosecutor, regulator, intelligence/security or counter-UAS response, with prioritisation for gross violations and serious threats. | Are reporting and escalation thresholds formally agreed? |
| SSA12 | Ensure active counter-UAS measures are legally authorised, recorded and proportionate. | Active measures such as jamming, cyber takeover, wireless interference or physical intervention should be legally designated, authorised, recorded and reviewed. | Are active counter-UAS deployments authorised, recorded and reviewed after use? |
| SSA13 | Align security and enforcement actions with the common local drone incident response workflow. | Security actors should connect reporting, verification, remote-pilot location, intervention, evidence handling, investigation and feedback into the local workflow. | Are security and enforcement actions integrated in the agreed local drone incident workflow? |
| SSA14 | Define evidence collection and offender-identification processes. | Evidence collection should cover remote-pilot identification, UAS seizure/examination, location evidence, witness statements, detection records and chain of custody. | Are evidence requirements and responsibilities documented between aerodrome, ANSP, police and prosecutor? |
| SSA15 | Support recovery and return-to-normal decisions through timely security assessment. | State security actors should provide threat status, enforcement status, evidence requirements and intervention constraints to support operational recovery decisions. | Are security inputs to recovery and incident closure defined and exercised? |
| SSA16 | Feed security lessons from drone incidents and exercises into joint learning. | Security actors should share appropriate lessons on evidence, remote-pilot location, intervention, escalation and enforcement outcomes with aviation stakeholders. | Are security lessons captured and fed back into joint procedures and exercises? |

## 6.6. LOCAL AND REGIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES, COMPETENT UNDER NATIONAL LAW

Local and regional law enforcement agencies will often provide the initial operational response to drone incidents. Their responsibilities should be distinguished from those of specialised State security actors, while ensuring clear escalation for severe or national-security cases and an agreed handover back to the competent local or regional agency when the specialised response is no longer required.

| Ref | Recommendation | What and how it should be done | Evidence / maturity question |
|---|---|---|---|
| LEA1 | Establish procedures for the initial local response, escalation and handover of drone incidents. | Define how local or regional law enforcement agencies receive and verify reports, coordinate with the aerodrome operator and ANSP, locate the remote pilot, preserve evidence, take proportionate enforcement action, escalate severe or national-security cases to State security actors and resume case ownership when specialised involvement ends. | Are initial response, escalation, specialist support and handover-back arrangements documented and exercised? |
| LEA2 | Participate in the local Drone Incident Management Cell (DIMC) or equivalent coordination structure. | Provide local response, remote-pilot location, evidence, investigation, enforcement and public-safety input. Maintain contact points and support joint preparation, exercises, incident response, recovery and post-event learning with the aerodrome operator, ANSP and State security actors.<br><br>Ref. EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual, Part 2.2.2. | Is the competent local or regional law enforcement agency represented in the local coordination structure, with defined and exercised responsibilities? |
| LEA3 | Participate in the common real-time situational awareness and information-sharing mechanism. | In cooperation with the aerodrome operator, ANSP and State security actors, exchange available information on UAS-related threats, including location, trajectory, behaviour, source reliability, uncertainty, remote-pilot location and enforcement status, subject to applicable law. | Are law-enforcement information needs, contributions, responsibilities and sharing constraints defined in the common mechanism? |
| LEA4 | Establish rapid cross-border information-sharing protocols for drone investigations. | Law enforcement agencies should pre-agree channels and procedures for requesting telemetry, remote-identification data and operator details from foreign counterparts when drone signals or operators cross national borders. | Are cross-border data-sharing arrangements and contact points established for drone incident investigations? |
| LEA5 | Define standard operating procedures for digital-evidence preservation and chain of custody. | Establish clear protocols for the seizure, forensic imaging and secure storage of UAS hardware, mobile devices and cloud-based flight logs to support evidential integrity and admissibility in court. | Are documented procedures for digital-evidence handling and chain of custody in place for drone investigations? |
| LEA6 | Develop joint case-preparation guidelines with prosecution services. | Law enforcement agencies and prosecution services should collaborate early to define evidentiary thresholds, required documentation and case-referral arrangements for drone offences. | Is there a joint protocol between law enforcement agencies and prosecution services for preparing drone-offence cases? |
| LEA7 | Implement coordinated public-communication protocols for high-impact drone incidents. | Define law-enforcement roles and coordination arrangements for media and public messaging during incidents to prevent misinformation, support public safety and avoid compromising active investigations. | Are media and public-communication roles for drone incidents formally defined and exercised? |
| LEA8 | Provide specialised training on the legal and operational constraints of active counter-UAS measures. | Provide role-appropriate tactical and legal training on jamming, spoofing, kinetic or other active measures, focusing on legal authority, proportionality, spectrum requirements, aviation-safety implications and collateral-risk mitigation. Training should not imply that local law enforcement agencies are authorised to use measures for which no legal mandate exists. | Do relevant officers receive recurrent training on the legal and operational limits of active counter-UAS measures? |

| Ref | Recommendation | What and how it should be done | Evidence / maturity question |
|---|---|---|---|
| LEA9 | Participate in a local drone coordination and partnership forum. | Support a recurring local drone coordination and partnership forum, where justified by the local operating environment, and drone-related risk.<br><br>The forum should promote cooperation, information sharing and mutual understanding between stakeholders with an interest in drone operations and their impact on aviation. Participants may include ANSPs, aircraft operators, local and regional law enforcement agencies, national authorities, municipalities and city governments, State Security Actors, military representatives where relevant, drone operators, drone associations, infrastructure providers and other local stakeholders.<br><br>The forum should address topics such as local drone trends, recurring hotspots, planned drone activities, awareness campaigns, reporting and lessons learned, community engagement, infrastructure developments, emerging technologies and opportunities to reduce the safety, security and operational impact of unauthorised drone activity.<br><br>The forum is distinct from a Drone Incident Management Cell (DIMC). Its purpose is to foster long-term collaboration, prevention, preparedness and continuous improvement rather than operational incident response. | Does the LEA participate in a recurring local drone coordination and partnership forum involving relevant public authorities, aviation stakeholders and representatives of the drone community to improve cooperation, awareness and the safe integration of drone operations? |

## 6.7. DRONE OPERATORS

| Ref | Recommendation | What and how it should be done | Evidence / maturity question |
|---|---|---|---|
| DO1 | Comply with geographical zones, authorisations, VLOS, height, daylight and competency requirements. | Drone operators should inform themself about how to conduct their drone/ UAS flight safely. Understand local restrictions, no-fly zones, height limits, VLOS requirements, assembly-of-people restrictions, payload restrictions, registration, relevant certificates and daylight limitations.<br>Obtain information using the EASA `Drone Rule Navigator \| EASA | Can operators demonstrate awareness and compliance with local conditions? |
| DO2 | Use published authorisation processes and notify relevant entities where required. | Authorised flights should be distinguishable from unauthorised activity by ANSPs, aerodromes and security actors. Planned volume, timing and contact details should be available where required, and pilots should ensure they can be contacted throughout the operation. | Are authorised operations visible to relevant stakeholders through agreed processes? |
| DO3 | Promotion of compliance with UAS geographic zones (UGZ) where drone activities are not permitted and / or are restricted. | When participating in model aircraft clubs or online communities for spotter or Drone pilots promote conduct that is protective of civil aviation and sanction and discourage activities which are generated with non-compliant Drone/ UAS flight behavior (such as photography in the flight paths of aerodromes). | |
| DO4 | Report occurrence in accordance with relevant national or European Reporting requirements for remote pilots (via the organization or as an individual). | An authorised drone can become a safety concern for different reasons if control is lost or authorisation parameters are exceeded.<br>Beyond what is legally required, consider to voluntarily report fly-aways, loss of control or non-compliance with UAS geographic zones (UGZ)<br><br>Anything that results in an immediate safety risk should be reported to the ANSP without delay. | Do Drone/ UAS operators know the reporting requirement applicable to them and know where and how to report loss of control or non-conforming flights respecting the timelines given for such reporting? |
| DO5 | Use available situational awareness technologies to support safe drone operations. | Drone operators should make appropriate use of available situational awareness tools and technologies, such as electronic conspicuity applications, U-space services, flight information applications and ADS-B IN receivers, where available and appropriate.<br><br>Such technologies can improve awareness of nearby air traffic and support safer operational decision-making. However, operators should recognise their limitations, including incomplete equipage, coverage limitations, latency, data quality issues and the possibility that not all aircraft will be visible through the selected system.<br><br>Technology should therefore be regarded as a supplementary source of situational awareness and should not replace compliance with applicable regulations, pre-flight planning, airspace checks, authorisation requirements, operational procedures, visual observation responsibilities or sound operational judgement | Are drone operators provided with guidance on the appropriate use and limitations of situational awareness technologies, and are these technologies used to support, rather than replace, regulatory compliance and operational risk management? |
| DO6 | Participate in local safety promotion and stakeholder engagement. | Drone operators should be part of prevention and learning, not only treated as a source of threat. | Are operator communities engaged in safety promotion and local consultation? |

## 6.8. EUROPEAN UNION & INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

| Ref | Recommendation | What and how it should be done | Evidence / maturity question |
|---|---|---|---|
| IO1 | Promote harmonised terminology and taxonomy used in E2. | Support common terms for unauthorised drone incidents, detection, proximity, risk, and reporting. | Is common terminology promoted through guidance, meetings or survey tools? |
| IO1 | Support exchange of best practices across regions and stakeholder groups. | Maintain practical examples from aerodromes, ANSPs, airlines, police, prosecutors, national authorities and international bodies. | Is a best-practice library or equivalent maintained and reviewed? |
| IO3 | Issue suitable guidance material on Drone Incident Management at aerodromes. | Develop and maintain suitable guidance material, in line with ICAO requirements and guidance material, with operational/ actionable content. | Does the guidance material reflect latest best practices and up-to-date responses to changing and new threats? |
| IO4 | Keep published Action Plans, manuals and guidance material up to date. | Regularly review and update documents like the European Action Plan for Managing the Operational Safety Impact of Unauthorised Drone Activity, the EASA DIMM, and other relevant publications to ensure the material reflects the latest best practices, while remaining consistent with other publications and provide up-to-date responses to evolving and emerging threats. | Are publications maintained and regularly updated to ensure the material reflects the latest best practices, while remaining consistent with other publications and providing up-to-date responses to evolving and emerging threats? |
| IO5 | Facilitate maturity benchmarking. | Convert recommendations into questionnaire items, collect maturity results, visualise implementation and support regional improvement discussions. | Is each recommendation connected to a maturity question, evidence item and dashboard field? |
| IO6 | Provide maturity-assessment methods that support benchmarking and improvement. | International organisations should promote anonymised or aggregated benchmarking, clear maturity questions and improvement-focused dashboard rules to encourage honest reporting. | Are maturity assessment and dashboard rules designed to support learning and improvement? |

# 7. ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

| Acronyms & abbreviations | Meaning |
|---|---|
| **ACC** | Area Control Centre |
| **ADS-B** | Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast |
| **AFIS** | Aerodrome Flight Information Service |
| **ANS** | Air Navigation Services |
| **ANSP** | Air Navigation Service Provider |
| **APP** | Approach Control |
| **ATC** | Air Traffic Control |
| **ATCO** | Air Traffic Control Officer |
| **ATFM** | Air Traffic Flow Management |
| **ATM** | Air Traffic Management |
| **CAA** | Civil Aviation Authority |
| **CNS** | Communications, Navigation and Surveillance |
| **C-UAS** | Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems |
| **DIMC** | Drone Incident Management Cell |
| **DIMM** | Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual |
| **DINOS WG** | Drones Impact on Network Operational Safety Working Group |
| **EASA** | European Union Aviation Safety Agency |
| **EU** | European Union |
| **LEA** | Law Enforcement Authority |
| **LSSIP** | Local Single Sky Implementation |
| **N/A** | Not applicable |
| **NMOC** | Network Manager Operations Centre |
| **NST** | Network Safety Team |
| **OCC** | Operations Control Centre |
| **OPA** | Operations Planning and Analysis |
| **RASP** | Regional Aviation Safety Plan |
| **RT** | Radiotelephony |
| **SAFOPS** | EUROCONTROL Operational Safety Group |
| **TWR** | Aerodrome Control Tower |
| **UAS** | Unmanned Aircraft System (In this document the colloquial term "Drone" is used) |
| **UAV** | Unmanned Aerial Vehicle |
| **UGZ** | UAS Geographical Zone |
| **VLOS** | Visual Line of Sight |

# 8. REFERENCES


DINOS WG - Unauthorised Drone Procedures for ANSPs - A Good Practice Guide. (available on request)

DINOS WG Tabletop Exercise template V2.

EASA Drone Incident Management at Aerodromes Manual. Part 1 of the manual, while Part 2 and 3 of the manual can be obtained on a need-to-know basis via the following email address: aerodromes@easa.europa.eu.

European Commission Action Plan on Drone and Counter-Drone Security, COM(2026) 81 final.

EUROCONTROL NMOC/OPA Unauthorised UAV Impact on Air Traffic Management in Europe 2025 (available on request)

EASA Drone Rule Navigator

# 9. CONTRIBUTORS

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