European Aviation Action Plan for Ensuring Safe Operations during GNSS Interferences

GNSS RFI Action Plan

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following a letter from 13 Member States to the European Commission on June 6, 2025, asking to take immediate action against Radio Frequency Interferences on Global Satellite Navigation System, EASA and EUROCONTROL decided to join their resources and experience, to prepare a common action plan covering aviation in the short and medium term. This plan is based on activities initiated by both organisations (Safety Impact Assessments, Best intervention Strategies, workshops and consultations) and is taking into consideration proposals from other bodies (ICAO, IATA).

Its first objective is to maintain safety of operations while avoiding negative impact on airspace capacity whenever possible by containing the threat for at least the next 3 years. The longer-term actions are anticipated to provide increased GNSS robustness and resilience.

The second objective is to reach global harmonisation by promoting this European action plan through ICAO.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACRONYM	DESCRIPTION
AIM	Aeronautical Information Management
ANSP	Air Navigation Service Provider
ATC	Air Traffic Control
ATCO	Air Traffic Controller
ATFCM	Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management
ATM	Air Traffic Management
BIS	Best Intervention Strategy
CAA	Civil Aviation Authority
CNS	Communications, Navigation and Surveillance
CNS-EP	CNS Evolution Plan
CRPA	Controlled Radiation Pattern Antennas
EACCC	European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell
EASA	European Union Aviation Safety Agency
ECTL	EUROCONTROL
EFB	Electronic Flight Bag
EPAS	European Plan for Aviation Safety
EU	Europe Union
EUROCAE	European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment
EUSPA	European Union Agency for the Space Programme
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FCOM	Flight Crew Operating Manual
FMS	Flight Management System
FSTD	Flight Simulation Training Device
GNSS	Global Navigation Satellite System
IATA	International Air Transport Association
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
JCSP	Joint CNS Stakeholder Consultation Platform
MASPS	Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards
MMR	Multi-Mode Receiver
MOPS	Minimum Operational Performance Standards
NDOP	Network Directors of Operations
NDTECH	Network Directors of Technology
NM	Network Manager
NPA	Notice of Proposed Amendment
NSA	National Security Agency
PBN	Performance-Based Navigation

RFI	Radio Frequency Interference
RMT	Rule Making Task
RNAV	Area Navigation
RNP	Required Navigation Performance
RTCA	Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
SARPs	Standards and Recommended Practices
SIB	Safety Information Bulletin
SRM	Security Risk Management
WS	Workstream

Introduction

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are vital for navigation, communication, and timing, yet Radio Frequency Interferences (RFI) threaten their reliability. As GNSS dependence grows in aviation, maritime, and many other domains not listed here, RFIs can disrupt services and compromise safety. It is assumed that RFIs will persist for the foreseeable future despite actions taken at ITU and ICAO aiming at eliminating or reducing the number and severity of RFI events.

Aircraft architectures rely significantly on GNSS to provide positioning and timing information for many functions and systems. It is not possible to implement individual technical solutions for all aircraft types in the short term. For ground-based ATC and ANSP operations, GNSS RFI affects all phases of flight by undermining key CNS systems, especially in regions near conflict zones. GNSS interference disrupts operations by contaminating the GNSS data used for surveillance, navigation and communication, indirectly impacting ATC by causing occasional side effects such as uncoordinated climbs, lateral or vertical deviations, increase of radar vectoring requests. and Flight inspection of terrestrial navigational aids calibration has also been impacted in very severe cases, challenging the ability to provide alternate navigation. Therefore, there is a need to implement operational measures in the short term while developing technical solutions for the medium and long terms.

On June 6, 2025 Ministers from Lithuania, Latvia, Slovak Republic, Germany, Estonia, Finland, Slovenia, Czechia, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, and Romania signed a letter to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, asking to take immediate actions including the development of plans for different domains (space, aviation, maritime, telecommunications) to avoid potential duplication of efforts and coordinate short-term and long-term measures at EU and national level.

EASA and EUROCONTROL took the initiative to prepare this first version of the action plan for civil aviation aiming at engaging with operational stakeholders, manufacturers and relevant authorities. This action plan aims at to define who should do what and by when to efficiently implement adequate actions and mitigations.

1. Scope and Objective of the action plan

The scope of this action plans is limited to civil aviation but does include enhanced civil-military cooperation. The objective of the action plan is to maintain safety of operations while avoiding negative impact on airspace capacity whenever possible.

Short-term actions ensure threat containment for the next 3 years, while medium (3-5 years) and long-term (5+ years) actions are anticipated to create solutions which combine increased GNSS robustness and resilience, with the use of alternative technologies and relevant ground, airborne and space-based infrastructure for positioning and timing along with associated standards development.

This European action plan can contribute to related activities in other regions or those organised at the global level by ICAO.

This action plan is synchronised with the future (long term) plan for European Communication Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) systems. The latest version of the Navigation roadmaps in CNS Evolution Plan 2026 is provided in Appendix B for information.

1.1 Main inputs

The mains inputs to this action plan are stemming from:

1) NM-EACCC

The EACCC exercise, held on 19–20 March 2025, focused on the growing threat of GNSS interference—particularly jamming and spoofing—and its impact on the European aviation ecosystem. Key lessons learned include the need for consistent and factual communication during spoofing events, improved understanding of spoofing risks, and the importance of technical backups such as ILS and VOR/DME. It was noted that coordination protocols and tactical responses vary widely among ANSPs, highlighting the need for more standardised operational procedures, recovery and reporting mechanisms.

Short-term EACCC recommendations include: developing standardised phraseology for pilot and ATC communications; enhancing coordination with national security and radio frequency agencies; implementing real-time GNSS interference monitoring tools; and establishing harmonized criteria for establishing and cancelling NOTAMs.

2) EASA Safety Information Bulletin and Best Intervention Strategies

EASA SIB 2022-02R3 'Global Navigation Satellite System Outage and Alterations Leading to Communication / Navigation / Surveillance Degradation[1]', revised on July 5, 2024, highlights increased severity and sophistication of these disruptions, causing navigation and surveillance issues like false TAWS alerts and flight diversions. The SIB recommends contingency procedures, alternative navigation systems, crew training, and reporting to mitigate risks.

In the context of the European Safety Risk Management[2] process, EASA is addressing the GNSS related issues through two dedicated Best Intervention Strategies:

a. BIS-35 "Impact of GNSS interferences on civil aviation operations" focuses on the impact of the GNSS outages and alterations on civil aviation operations, and how

[1] EASA Safety Publications Tool
[2] Safety Risk Management | EASA

the products, human performance of the actors, and organisations can cope with it in the present conditions. It determines the associated risks, identifies the weak or missing barriers, and proposes the mitigation actions to avert accident outcomes.

b. BIS-44 "Safe operations in a PBN environment" addresses the issues that result from the application of Art.5 'Exclusive use of PBN' and Art.6 'Contingency measures' of the PBN IR as of 2030.

3) EASA-IATA workshop, May 2025

Operational stakeholders and manufacturers shared a valuable set of best practices and experiences to mitigate impact of RFIs in the short term, and their plans to enhance technical capabilities for the medium and long terms[3].

4) ICAO working papers for ANC, other forums;

GNSS RFI has been a key topic at the 41st ICAO Assembly in 2022, The main outcome, based on a European paper (WP97), was Assembly Resolution 41-8C, which is the established ICAO policy on GNSS RFI and its mitigation and promotes a complementary, multi-sensor approach for the long term. A variety of papers to the 42nd Assembly proposed refinements to the resolution, which has been updated and re-issued as an outcome of the 42nd Assembly. Similarly, the 14th Air Navigation Conference in 2024 also dealt with numerous papers on the subject and agreed several resulting recommendations (ANConf/14 Rec 2.2-2), which are updating the work programme of the ICAO panels. ICAO has also held multiple regional workshops and issued State Letters which summarise the outcomes of the workshops and make several recommendations. The topic has the highest priority at the ICAO Council and Air Navigation Commission, who receive regular updates through informal briefing (leading, among other items, to the joint declaration with IMO and ITU on the need to protect satellite navigation radio spectrum). These activities are summarised in WP34 to the 42nd Assembly.

The Navigation Systems Panel has updated its job cards on Complementary PNT and on Resilient Operational Networks (RON). More short-term operational actions are assigned to the Instrument Flight Procedures and the Flight Operations Panel. The NSP is also developing, in coordination with RTCA/EUROCAE and the Surveillance Panel, a future capability where GNSS RFI status from aircraft GNSS receivers will downlink their RFI status using ADS-B messages with a built for purpose function.

5) EUROCAE

EUROCAE WG62 (joint with RTCA SC159) is working on the Dual Frequency, Multi-Constellation GNSS Receiver MOPS. ED259B, expected to pass open consultation in 2026 / 2027, will contain a number of measures to improve GNSS receiver robustness, such as, for example, a requirement to recover from RFI once the receiver has left the RFI impacted area.

EUROCAE WG85 (joint with RTCA SC227) updates the RNP MASPS and MOPS, which are the navigation standards used by FMS. The current work focuses on improving multi-sensor positioning and updating / clarifying a variety of DME related navigation requirements.

EUROCAE WG107 updates the DME Transponder MOPS (ground facility) and will provide a MASPS which will describe how DME-based RNP can be achieved, in cooperation with WG-85.

[3] EASA and IATA outline comprehensive plan to mitigate GNSS interference risks | EASA

EUROCAE WG133 has just started to evaluate options for introducing multi-element GNSS antennas in aviation (Controlled Radiation Pattern Antennas, CRPA).

EUROCAE WG 134 aims at updating the DME interrogator MOPS to recognize technological advances and allow the DME range data consumers, in particular Flight Management Systems (FMS), to take benefit and credit from better performance. This is of particular importance in the context the urgent need of ensuring that DME is an adequate means to elaborate RNAV and RNP navigation solutions. Adapting the MOPS requirement to today's capabilities will translate in better adequacy of DME navigation for more stringent navigation specifications in terms of accuracy, integrity, and continuity.

EUROCAE has also just started a wider cooperation among EUROCAE groups (with standards which make use of GNSS) to help ensure a consolidated effort in improving next generation equipment standards to be less vulnerable to GNSS RFI.

1.2 Management of the action plan

The Joint CNS Stakeholders Platform (JCSP) established by EASA and EUROCONTROL Network Manager will serve as the main platform to engage with stakeholders to prepare, maintain and monitor implementation of this action plan.

The joint session of NDOP and NDTECH will be consulted and will endorse this action plan.

Network Management Board will be informed about this action plan.

EASA Management Board endorses this action plan after consultation with advisory bodies.

Action plan is a living document that will be updated regularly considering evolution of the RFIs events and mitigation measures.

1.3 Structure of the action plan

The action plan is structured by priority and timeframe: short-term actions (1–3 years) address urgent issues and can be implemented quickly, medium-term actions (3–5 years) require more development or coordination, and long-term actions (5+ years) focus on strategic measures dependent on technological or regulatory advancements. This sequencing ensures immediate risks are mitigated while building long-term resilience of the European aviation system.

The following fields define the key elements of the action plan, ensuring each action is clearly described, categorised, assigned, and aligned with relevant stakeholders, timelines, and ongoing initiatives.

Action Plan Fields:

- Action number
- Action – A brief description of the measure or activity to be undertaken.
- Category – The thematic or priority grouping. This category could be:
    - Rulemaking, Safety Promotion; Research, Evaluation , Implementation Support , Member State Task as defined for EPAS[4]

[4] EPAS_Action_Types_and_Templates.pdf

  - Operational management: refers to the definition of a set of procedures used by operational stakeholders (ANSPs, Aircraft operators) to detect, assess, mitigate and recover from operational disruptions caused by GNSS interference.
  - Coordination: refers to the collaboration and timely information sharing among civil and military aviation entities to mitigate the risks associated with GNSS interferences.
  - Standardisation refers to the development, harmonisation, and implementation of technical specifications and operational procedures enabling resilient positioning, navigation and timing.

- Action Owner – The individual, team, or organization responsible for delivering the action.
- Targeted Stakeholders (Responsible or Impacted) – Parties who are expected to implement or apply the action delivered by the action owner.
- Implementation Timeline – Planned duration or completion target, aligned with short-, medium-, or long-term priorities.
- Links with Ongoing Initiatives – References to related projects, programs, or frameworks already in progress.
- Workstream (WS) - Reference to the workstream under which the action is planned, coordinated, executed, and monitored. Proposed Workstreams:
  - WS1: Human performance (pilots, ATCOs, etc.)
  - WS2: Organisational management systems – policies and procedures (air operators, ANSPs, training, etc.) + Authority oversight
  - WS3: Aircraft design (including avionics equipment)
  - WS4: Infrastructure (VOR, DME, ILS, radars, etc.)

2. Short-term actions

#	Action description	Category[5]	Owner	Stakeholders responsible or impacted	Implementation timeline	Deliverbale	Link with ongoing initiatives	Workstream
1.	Explore the feasibility of using non installed spoofing detector and Electronic Flight Bags (EFB) to enhance situational awareness of the crew - EFB with “GNSS” weather map; - on board non installed RFI detector.	TBD	EASA	System/data suppliers A/C Manufacturers Operators	2026	BIS report	BIS-35	WS1
2.	Development of minimum requirements for GNSS interference monitoring tools.	Operational	ECTL EASA	NM, ANSPs, Aircraft operators, DEFIS, EUSPA	2026	BIS report Tool	BIS-35 EACCC	WS2
3.	Assess the need to promote OPS approvals for operators which are: a) RNAV capable, or b) RNP capable based on DME or DME/INS and ensure correct flight plan filing.	TBD	EASA	AO	2025 - 2028	Standard AO OPS Approvals	EUROCAE WG107	WS2
4.	Develop criteria and establish a harmonised approach for determining the start and end of GNSS interference and the appropriate time to establish and cancel NOTAMs and other AIM	Operational	ECTL	ANSPs, CAAs, NSAs[6]	2026	Guidance	EACCC	WS2

[5] Regulatory, Safety Promotion, ET: Evaluation Task, IST: Implementation Support Task, Research, MST: Member State Task (can be augmented in the context of this WP), OPS: Operational management, Infrastructure resilience, CO: Coordination, RES: Research & standardisation

[6] NSA: National Security Agency, CAA: Civil Aviation Authority

#	Action description	Category[5]	Owner	Stakeholders responsible or impacted	Implementation timeline	Deliverbale	Link with ongoing initiatives	Workstream
	products, considering pilot reports, measurement data and information from national security agencies.							
5.	Investigate the feasibility of using post-flight logs from aircraft to assess ongoing GNSS interference and support recovery efforts.	TBD	TBD (D4S – Joint workspace)	Aircraft operators	2026	Reports	EACCC	WS3
6.	Analyse the current setup and situation to include radio monitoring and spectrum agencies including the national crisis management structure.	Coordination	ECTL	States	2027	Report	EACCC	WS2
7.	Establish a coordinated response that aligns all members to minimize the risk and impact of jamming and spoofing scenarios on the network.	Operational	ECTL	NM, ANSPs, Aircraft operators, States, Airports	TBD	Guidance	EACCC	WS2
8.	Develop guidance to support development of a National GNSS contingency and operations plans and ATM/ATFCM procedures for safe management of GNSS interference situations.	Operational	ECTL	ANSPs, CAAs	2027	Guidance	(RMT-0761)	WS2
9.	Update the standard phraseology related to GNSS interference events (spoofing and jamming) to allow standard communication between pilots and Air Traffic Controllers.	Regulatory	ICAO Supported by EASA-ECTL	Aircraft operators, ANSPs	2026	BIS report Proposal to ICAO	BIS-35	WS1

#	Action description	Category[5]	Owner	Stakeholders responsible or impacted	Implementation timeline	Deliverbale	Link with ongoing initiatives	Workstream
10.	Harmonise the procedures among air operators and ANSPs on how to deal with spurious TAWS alerts'.	Regulatory	ICAO Supported by EASA-ECTL	Aircraft operators, ANSPs	2026	BIS report Proposal to ICAO	BIS-35	WS1
11.	Optimise current infrastructure (VOR/DME/TACAN...) in a way allowing optimum RNAV and RNP coverage and conventional backup and ensure flight crews are aware of such provided infrastructure.	Implementation Support	ECTL (States) ECTL -NM	States, ANSPs	2026	CNS-EP 2026	BIS-44 (RMT-0761) BIS-35	WS4
12.	Update PBN IR to ensure safe operation in a PBN environment to address the negative effects resulting from the restrictions to fly conventional navigation, particularly, ILS CAT I procedures and to further support the implementation of contingency measures.	Rulemaking	EASA	ANSP, Aircraft Manufacturers	< 2030	NPA Q3 2026 and Opinion 2027	RMT.0761	WS1
13.	Provide availability of FSTD features simulating GNSS RFI conditions and consequent aircraft failures/abnormal behaviours in all phases of flight.	Research Safety Promotion Member State Task	EASA/ECTL	Member States FSTD, ATOs	2028	BIS report Research report	BIS-35	WS1
14.	Take proactive measure for evolution of the threat, including targeted spoofing, or situations that would trigger a safety directive.	Safety Promotion	EASA	Aircraft manufactures	2026	BIS report	BIS-35 Existing Spoofing Studies by EASA, EUROCONTROL and FAA)	WS3

#	Action description	Category[5]	Owner	Stakeholders responsible or impacted	Implementation timeline	Deliverbale	Link with ongoing initiatives	Workstream
15.	Develop a tool to enhance coordination with national security and military agencies to obtain timely information on GNSS interference sources and improve on proactive dissemination of information.	Coordination	ECTL Member States EASA	NSAs, CAAs, ANSPs, NM, Aircraft Operators, EEAS	2026	Tool (ECTL GRIT)	ECTL: GRIT	WS2
16.	Increase robustness of a/c against GNSS RFI - Restore GNSS capability (MMR) after interference - Develop FCOM procedures to restore time and datalink.	Rulemaking Operational	EASA	Aircraft Manufacturers	2028	BIS report	BIS-35	WS3
17.	Assess the need/impact of mandating crew training (via SRM or management of change).	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	WS1

3. Mid- and Long-term actions (post 2030)

#	Action description	Category[7]	Owner	Stakeholders responsible or impacted	Implementation timeline	Deliverbale	Link with ongoing initiatives	Workstream
18.	Optimise CNS infrastructure (including DME network optimisation).	Implementation Support	ECTL-NM	CAAs, ANSPs	2030-2040	CNS-EP	CNS-PM	WS4
19.	Assessment and possible deployment of a resilient GNSS infrastructure for timing and positioning, subject to available funding, including complementary infrastructure in case of GNSS unavailability (e.g. LEO PNT, LDACS, reference time distribution systems, etc).	Implementation Support	DEFIS, EUSPA CNS-PM EASA (Airworthiness)	States, ASNP, Aircraft manufacturers	DEFIS EUSPA roadmap + next MFF (2027-2034) 2030-2040	CNS-EP	CNS-PM	WS4
20.	Mandate Training on how to apply mitigation procedure for Flight Crew and ATCOs.	TBD	EASA		TBD	EASA decision	Candidate Issue + Specific Impact Assessment	WS1
21.	Upgrade aircraft navigation systems to detect, report and recover from spoofing and jamming.	Support, rulemaking, standardisation, airworthiness	EASA	Aircraft manufacturers, and Receiver manufacturers SDOs		BIS report	BIS-35	WS3

[7] Regulatory, Safety Promotion, ET: Evaluation Task, IST: Implementation Support Task, Research, MST: Member State Task (can be augmented in the context of this WP), OPS: Operational management, Infrastructure resilience, CO: Coordination, RES: Research & standardisation

#	Action description	Category[7]	Owner	Stakeholders responsible or impacted	Implementation timeline	Deliverbale	Link with ongoing initiatives	Workstream
22.	Study & support the standardisation of new GNSS interference mitigation technologies (e.g. CRPA, Signal authentication, adaptative antenna, robust independent time reference, etc).	Standardisation	EUROCAE/RTCA ICAO	Aircraft manufacturers, and Receiver manufacturers SDOs	EUSPA standardisation roadmap 2029	MOPS, MASPS, SARPS Other standards		WS3

4. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

4.1 Current operational environment

Today real-time GNSS interference monitoring tools are unavailable, leading to delayed awareness of GNSS RFI. This is sufficient for broad interference indications but inadequate for rapid responses. Consequently, some ANSPs switch to using procedures with conventional navaids (VOR, ILS, DME) as a temporary reversion solution, typically limited to the time of exposure to the RFI.

Flight crews are relying on system outputs (GPS PRIMARY LOSS messages), or unusual system behaviour (map shift, time anomalies) to assess the situation, without early warnings. Training is unharmonized, with limited to no Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) simulation capabilities, and a lack of standardized reactions across flight phases.

In some areas, conventional ground infrastructure is scarce (VOR/ILS/etc), creating vulnerable areas. Contingency plans across Member States vary, with ATM procedures being non-uniform to ensure smooth reversion or contingency operations. Interference criteria lack harmonised definition, resulting in inconsistent NOTAMs issued by national AIS. The usage of unclear text to describe GNSS RFI events complicates coordination.

4.2 Future operational environment and scenarios

Scenario – Operations in nominal GNSS environment

Real-time GNSS interference monitoring tools are available, providing early warnings to ATC and flight crews for proactive reaction.

Flight crews use EFBs with GNSS “weather maps” and/or non-installed RFI detectors for early detection. The crew is trained via FSTD capable of simulating GNSS RFI conditions, and the crew is trained on how to report GNSS events: i.e. the crew is trained to react to GNSS interferences in all phases of flight.

Using real time interference detection, ATC is aware of possible disruptions in the airspace under their responsibility and trained to manage traffic in case of interferences.

Infrastructure is rationalized to provide optimal RNAV or RNP coverage with conventional navigation aids.

Contingency plans are harmonized, including ATM procedures for seamless transition to degraded modes, ensuring readiness for potential interference events.

Scenario – Operations in degraded GNSS environment

Close to real-time monitoring tools integrate several data sources to identify affected airspace and flights, triggering alerts to ATCs and crews. Harmonized criteria determine interference start/end, NOTAMs and AIM products based on pilot reports, measurements, and agency intel are made available.

Updated phraseology enables standard communication during events.

Harmonized national contingency plans and ATM procedures guide traffic rerouting, minimizing network impact.

Enhanced coordination with security agencies provides proactive dissemination of threat information.

Post event analysis

Post-flight logs from aircraft are assessed to improve reaction to future events and prepare for any evolution of threats: evolution of flight crew and ATCO procedures.

Appendix A: Actions timeline



Appendix B: Navigation roadmap in CNS Evolution Plan 2026 [DRAFT – UNDER PUBLIC CONSULTATION]

NAV implementation roadmap (up to 2035)

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

NAV enablers roadmap (up to 2050)

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

NAV evolution roadmap (up to 2050)

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

NAV evolution key milestones roadmap (up to 2032)

DRAFT – UNDER PUBLIC CONSULTATION



Appendix C: EUSPA Roadmap

This note provides an overview of the activities in the aviation domain that aim to monitor and mitigate harmful Radio Frequency Interference or RFI (i.e., jamming and spoofing) to GNSS signals, in line with the WRC23 resolution 676[8].



RFI-related activities at the different standardisation fora (orange, yellow and green) and RFI-related projects and activities providing inputs to those fora (blue and purple). Activities whose timeline goes beyond the period displayed (i.e., beyond EOY 2029) do not have a deadline set for the corresponding activity indicated within the box.

[8] WRC-23 Res.676 is the result of continuous reporting to ITU over years under the lead of EUROCONTROL of the presence of significant levels of interference to the use of RNSS in aviation.

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