



**Federal Aviation
Administration**

AVIATION INFORMATION NOTE


9 JUNE 2025

Prepared by the Office of Security & Hazardous Material Safety (ASH)

(U) Burma: Elevated Navigation Risk within the Yangon Flight Information Region

(U//FOUO) The risk to civil aviation navigation within the Yangon Flight Information Region (FIR) will very likely increase over the next five months due to ongoing electronic interference and forecasted weather conditions. Electronic warfare (EW) systems, namely Global Positioning System (GPS) jammers and spoofers regularly impact civil aviation navigation systems within the Yangon FIR; however, over the last two months, there has been a significant increase in aircraft being caught in circular spoofing patterns. While GPS disruptions are a near-daily occurrence, the upcoming monsoon season (June-October) is expected to limit visibility and require operators to rely more on instrument flight rule (IFR) operations.

- **(U)** Since April 2025, we observed multiple indications of GPS spoofing within the Yangon FIR, primarily along the A599, B465, and G463 air routes due to their concentrated flight volume. These indications include a significant discrepancy between the aircraft's actual speed versus its broadcasted ground speed, inconsistent navigation accuracy category for position (NACp)^a, and Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) "PULL-UP" alerts. Aircraft commonly broadcasted a speed of 10-30kts over their Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) for the duration of the capture, whereas the NACp varied from 9 (< 30m) to 0 (≥ 18.5 km [unknown accuracy]). When spoofed, we observed erroneous aircraft positions circling just outside of Naypyidaw International Airport (VYNT), with some aircraft positions jumping as far as ~250NM.



^a **(U)** Navigation accuracy category for position (NACp) is a parameter that indicates the estimated accuracy of an aircraft's position based on the Estimated Position Uncertainty (EPU). EPU represents the radius of a circle around the reported aircraft position with 95% confidence that the actual aircraft position will fall within that circle.

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- **(U)** Between June and October, weather conditions within the Yangon FIR typically include heavy rain and strong winds, which causes reduced visibility and increased turbulence during flights. These conditions historically force operators to rely on instruments that can be unreliable if impacted by GPS jamming or spoofing.

(U//FOUO) The reduced visibility from the weather conditions within the Yangon FIR combined with unreliable GPS-based navigation and dependent systems, will almost certainly increase pilot and controller workload. These conditions potentially will force operators to rely on less precise navigation methods and increase the risk of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). These ongoing navigation concerns are part of a broader risk to operating aircraft in Burma. The country has been in a state of civil war since 2021, resulting in ongoing, intermittent conflict related skirmishes between multiple groups which have access to man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), rockets, weaponized unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and explosives.

**(U) ADMINISTRATIVE
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(U) Information cutoff date (ICOD): 29 May 2025

(U) FAA coordinated this product with the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Transportation Security Administration, and United States Coast Guard Navigation Center. This product addresses PIR 2, 3, and 4.

(U) If there are any questions, please contact the FAA Threat Analysis Division (AXE-200) at 202-267-3203 or FAA-Watch@faa.gov.